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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plointiff/Respondent, 
vs. . . Case No. 18,337 
THOMAS P. DYER, 
Defendont/Appellant. 
-----------------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah filed an Information charging the 
defendant with murder in the second degree, a felony of the first 
degree, in violation of Section 76-5-203, Utah Criminal Code, as 
c:mended. Subsequent thereto, the State of Utah amended the 
Information charging the defendant with the crime of 
manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, in violation of 
Section 76-5-205, Utah Criminal Code, as amended. 
The charging part of the amended Inform2tion accused the 
defendant as follows: 
"[That] THOMAS PETERSON DYER did recklessly c2use the 
death of Nina Marie Fuellemc:n." 
DISPOS~T:ON I~ THE LOWER COURT 
- -- ---
The case was tried in the Fourth Judicial District Court in 
1 
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and for Utah County, State of Utah, sitting in Provo, Utah, on 
March 3 and 4, 1982, with the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge, 
presiding. 
The case was heard without a jury pursuant to defendant's 
Waiver of a Jury Trial. Judge Bullock rendered a judgment 
finding that he could not find the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. After a subsequent 
hearing Judge Bullock found the defendant guilty of negligent 
homicide. 
The defendant was sentenced to a term of one year in the 
Utah County Jail and to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the late evening of August 21, 1981, defendant, in the 
company of his brother, Rob, and the victim, went to a tavern 
known as the Forrest Inn, where all partook of 2lcoholic 
beverages. All three left the Forrest Inn at approximately 1:30 
o'clock a.m. (August 22, 1981) and arrived at the residence of 
defendant and Rob at about 2:00 a.m. Defendant and Rob were 
arguing as they arrived at their residence. Victim went upstairs 
to the second floor and defendant and Rob pursued the argument on 
the first floor. The argument culminated when Rob struck 
defendant several times, knocked him down, and began choking 
defendant. Defendant never struck back, and was passive during 
the fight. The argument was over prior to the time that the 
rifle was discharged. (R. 308, Line 30, 309, Lines 1-5) 
During the argument the victim was upstairs on the second 
2 
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floor, and the defend2nt and Rob were on the first floor. 
Rob let defendant up, and defendant went to the bedroom 
wher€ he obtained a .30-.30 caliber lever action rifle. Rob had 
used the rifle last (R. 305, Line 4). Rob testified that he 
never did see defendant use the gun after Rob had used it CR. 
305, Lines 9-10). 
The first recollection that Rob testified to was that he saw 
the gun exploding CR. 294, Line 2). Rob's testimony was that at 
no time was the gun pointed in his direction (R. 294, Line 15; 
307, Lines 14-16; 312, Line 22). Rob testified that the rifle 
was pointed down and not in his direction (R. 294, line 19), Rob 
testified that the gun was never at any time used by the 
defendant to threaten Rob (R. 307, lines 10-15; 310, lines 5-9). 
Rob testified that the defendant did not draw the gun with the 
intention of shooting (R. 307 7 lines 5-13). The State did not 
produce any evidence showing that the defendant loaded the gun or 
knew that the gun was loaded. The gun was accidentally dis-
charged CR. 300, Line 28; 308, Lines 6-9), causing the death of 
the victim \ who, unknown to both defend2nt and Rob, had walked 
from the second floor to the fir st floor. 
ARGUME~~T 
The Points in appellant's argument are intended to present 
to the Court legal premises in an order which, if accepted by the 
Court as a basis for reversal, would preclude consideratiorl of 
subsequent points. 
PO I :JT I 
TH:: TRIAL CCURT IS ,,-{ITHCUT AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER A LESSER 
A : l D I : ; C L U D E D 0 F F E N S E I N V I E ·.~ C F I T S F I tJ D I :~ G 0 F N 0 T G U I L T Y A S T O 
j 
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THE CHARGE OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
(A) The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America provides, 
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... ". 
At the conclusion of argument by counsel, the Court, in 
essence, rendered a verdict of not guilty to the charge of 
manslaughter: 
"THE COURT: Okay. I am convinced -- well, let's put 
it another way: that the evidence is not convincing that the 
defendant intentionally pulled the trigger on the rifle. 
I'd have to find that, I think, in order to find this man 
guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
I can't do that. However, I agree with what you say with 
respect to the negligence involved in bringing a loaded, 
taking a 102ded rifle under the circumstances, being intox-
icated, having it on his lap, having it in a condition that 
it can be discharged accidentally with people around, and I 
believe that that is negligent homicide under Section 
76-5-206. However, I'm not going to pass sentence--strike 
that. I'm not going to find that he's guilty of that 
offense this afternoon. I'm going to give you an oppor-
tunity to brief the law on that matter, and you can come 
back here tomorrow morning." (R. 355, lines 7-22) 
Neither plaintiff nor defendant requested a lesser included 
offense. 
(B) The State unilaterally amended the charge to 
manslaughter. 
Defense counsel, on the other hand, based upon what he 
determined was in the best interests of defendant, took the 
strategic position that the evidence would not sustain a convic-
tion of manslaughter. 
The trial court held that the evidence was not sufficient to 
support a conviction of manslaughter. The trial judge entered 
into the prosecutori2l strategy of the Cose by reevaluating the 
case when he determined that the charge should have been 
4 
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negligent homicide. The strategy of the defense, having been 2n 
all or nothing approach, was also violated. It needs to be 
accepted at this point that a cardinal rule of trial practice 
regarding the three principal participants (the judge, and the 
two opposing lawyers) is that (1) the judge will not act in any 
manner which will influence the outcome of the trial; and (2) the 
opposing lawyers are entitled to their strategy in dealing with 
their ca·se. In the present case, the judge modified the rules. 
He challenged and defeated the competency of the prosecutor; he 
in essence told the prosecutor that his evaluation of the case 
was wrong. The Judge, by his actions, deprived the defense 
attorney of conducting that strategy which, in his judgment, was 
in the best interest of his client. 
(C) The State of Utah has previously taken a position 
that is consistent with and supports the position urged by the 
defendant in this case. 
In State v. Bagge~~ (Case No. 16232), the State of Utah 
argwec: 
" ... the appellant did not establish any basis upon 
which he could be convicted of the lesser offense because he 
desired an acquittal based on an all or nothing theory of 
the defense. In State~ Mor_§., 588 P.2d 1335 (Utah, 1977) 
this Court distinguished situations similar to this one and 
stated that lesser included offense instructions were not 
2bsolutely necessary where the appellant was attempting an 
all or nothing theory of defense." (Page 4) 
" ... The apellant was informed of his options by his 
counsel and decided to attempt to gain 2n acquittal by 
proceeding on an all or nothing defense theory ... ". (Page 5-
6) 
POINT II 
~~ E G L I GE NT H 0 M I C I DE IS N 0 T A LE S S E R I ~~ C L U DE D 0 F F E NS E o F 
5 
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MANSLAUGHTER. 
From a statutory point of view, the Code does not 
specifically provide that negligent homicide is a lesser included 
offense of manslaughter. Section 76-2-101, Utah Code Annotated, 
defines the "requirements of criminal conduct and criminal res-
ponsibility" as follows: 
"No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct 
is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly 
or with criminal negligence with respect to each 
element of the offense as the definition of the offense 
requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability." 
The states of mind that will sustain a conviction are set 
forth disjunctively as "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or 
with criminal negligence". The issue is whether the mental state 
sufficient to establish criminal negligence is a lesser and 
included aspect of recklessly. It is the position of the 
defendant that it is not. 
In view of the fact that convictions on the charge of 
manslaughter may be obtained on proof of facts other than 
reckless conduct, [Section 76-2-206 (b) and (c)], negligent 
homicide cc.nnot be deemed a lesser and included offense thereof. 
The statutory language defining "recklessly" and "with criminal 
negligence" [Section 76-2-103 (3) and (4), Utah Code Annotated] 
are similar with the following exceptions: 
( 3) 
Recklessly, or maliciously, 
( 4) 
with criminal negligence 
or is criminally negligent 
with respect to circumstances 
6 
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surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he 
is aware of but consc-
iously disregards 
ought to be aware of 
its disregard 
under 
a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that 
an ordinary person would exercise 
in 
all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
Section 76-5-201, Utah Code Annotated, specified five 
different designations of homicide. Thereafter, in the same 
chapter, each designation is defined as to the act and intent 
necessary to make it out. The victim in each designation is no 
less dead as a result of the described acts and intent that are 
necessary to make out the offense. The legislature has followed 
an accepted pattern of treating defendants on the basis of the 
types of acts committed in order to prescribe punishment. The 
acts are the products of the culpable mental state partially 
described above. The presumption, with regard to the issue set 
forth is that the offense of negligent homicide is not a lesser 
' 
included offense of manslaughter, vis-a-vis recklessly and with 
criminc:l negligence. Here the burden of proof does not lessen 
because the elements are different. 
It will be argued that one ough.!:_ to be aware of that which 
he is aware of, but an examination of the most significant 
7 
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h " . t differences in the subsections of the statute deal wit ... 1 s 
disreg2rd ... " as the reckless element as opposed to " ... the 
failurs to perceive it ... " in the criminally negligent element; 
the former being an active disregard of the risk, the latter 
being a passive oblivion regarding the risk. 
State v. How~~d, 597 P.2d 878, stands for the proposition 
that negligent homicide is not a lesser included offense of the 
charge of manslaughter. Paragraph (3) of Section 76-1-402, Utah 
Criminal Code, provides as follows: 
"A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in 
the offense charged, but may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
"(a) It is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
"(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspirary or form of preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
"(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as 
a lesser included offense." 
Subparagraph (c) is not helpful in that nowhere in the Utah 
Cr:.minal Code is negligent homicide specified as a lesser 
included offense of manslaughter. 
Subpar2gr3ph (b) is also of no help in that the offense of 
negligent homicide is not En inchoate offense. It is a 
completed act and in no way can be considered an attempt, solici-
tation, conspiracy or form of preparation for the crime of man-
S 1 ·:.uah~er ..,(;; 0 I.I • 
5ubparagraph (a) needs to be considered in light of the 
comparison given above; however, negligent hooicide in no way can 
be considered 2 lesser included offense of manslaug~ter under the 
8 
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circumstances provided in subparagraphs (b) and (c) to paragraph 
1 of Section 76-5-205, Utah Criminal Code. 
The following portion of respondent's (State of Utah) Brief 
in the case of State vs. Boggess, (Case No. 16232) is quoted in 
---- -- ------
support of defendant's position 
"STATUTORY AND CASE LAW SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MAN-
SLAUGHTER OR SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
"The analysis in the respondent's initial Brief (P. 5-
8) has been adopted by this Court in St2te v. Hendricks, 695 
P.2d 633 (Utah, 1979) where this Court determined that 
criminal trespass possessed intent elements which differed 
from the alleged greater offense of burglary. Thus, proof 
of burglary does not 'necessarily include proof of all the 
elements necessary to prove the lesser' crime of criminc:l 
trespass, and in accordance with the standard established in 
State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1 962) 
criminal trespa-ss is not a lesser included offense of 
burglary. Similar to that case, in the present case the 
alleged lesser included offense contains a mental element 
which distinguishes it from the alleged greater offense of 
manslaughter and second degree murder. The crimes of second 
degree murder and manslaughter contained a different element 
of intent than that required for a conviction of negligent 
homicide. The difference, when read in light of the 
Hendricks and Brennan, supra, line of cases, demonstrates 
that-negligent homicide is not necessarily a lesser included 
offense of manslaughter or second degree murder." 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
Criminal negligence is defined in Section 76-2-103 (4) as 
follows: 
"With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist 
or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise i_n all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpo1nt.u 
9 
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The language of the statute seems to use a rel2tively large 
number of words to state that criminal negligence is acting where 
one ought. to be aware of a certain risk. The types of risk that 
may come within the definition of "certain risk" are uncertain. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the applica-
tion is subjective, " ... as viewed from the actor's viewpoint." 
[Section 76-2-103 (4), Utah Criminal Code]. 
The evidence presented by the State at trial is summarized 
as follows: 
(a) That during the period before the shooting, 
defendant, in the presence of victim, had been arguing with 
Robert Dyer (brother) during which time defendant had been 
consuming intoxicating liquor. 
(b) That upon the three returr.ing home from the 
Forrest Inn, brother took the keys to defendant's car, thereby 
prohibiting defendant from going elsewhere. 
(c) Victim went upstairs to brother's room and was not 
heard from between that time and the time of the shooting. 
(d) That brother knew that defendant had been drinking 
intoxicating liquor and continued to press the argument. 
(e) That brother struck defendant sever2l times, began 
choking him, and then let him up when he felt shame for taking 
advantage of defendant. 
(f) That defendant went straight to his bedroom and 
had the rifle out when brother reached the doorway. 
(g) That defendant could not see the victim when the 
rifle accidentally discharged. 
(h) That the discharge of the rifle was not 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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intentionc:l, but was an accident. 
(i) That victim was struck in the face by a portion of 
the projectile after it passed through the door jam, resulting in 
her death. 
There is no evidence before the Court that the defendant 
loaded the rifle or knew that it was loaded. The argument had 
terminated prior to the time that the gun was accidentally 
discharged. Defendant's contention is that sufficient proof is 
necessary to sustain a conviction. 
The Court's finding was that " ... the evidence is not 
convincing that the defendant intentionally pulled the trigger on 
the rifle ... " CR. 355, Line 8 - 10) It seems that the Court's 
judgment at that point may have been based upon other considera-
tions, but that the quoted finding was the most obvious fact that 
precluded a finding of guilty to the charge of manslaughter. Had 
the evidence convinced the Court that the trigger had been inten-
tion ally pulled in a careless act of frustration, the "from the 
actor's standpoint" issue would have been seriously analyzed in 
order to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the charge of 
manslaughter. 
It is important to remember that the evidence was that the 
gun was not pointed at anyone, the gun was never used to threaten 
anyone, and the gun was not part of the argument. The argument 
was over prior to the accidental shooting. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant urges that the judge sitting alone can do nothing 
which r.e would not be empowered to do with the aid of a jury. He 
2 iso urges that the consideration by the trial judge in this case 
1 1 
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of a lesser included offense without the express request of 
defendant constitutes a violation of his sixth amendment right 
not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, as well 
as an open participation by the judge in the prosecution of the 
case. For these reasons defendant respectfully requests a 
reversal of his conviction. 
Defendant urges that, under the present state of the law and 
under the facts of this case, negligent homicide is not a lesser 
and included offense of manslaughter. For this reason defendant 
requests that his conviction be reversed. 
Defendant urges that the facts in this case do not support a 
conviction to the charge of negligent homicide; rather, the 
evidence supports a conclusion that the shooting was accidental -
not criminal. Defendant requests that his conviction be 
reversed. 
rv~-tb­Subrnitted this orc:J day 
//-1 
. /'/ 
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/ _/ )' I. / 
:_,R©-NALD . S ANGER L -
Attorney for Defendant 
' / 
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mr. D2vid N. Wilkinson, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this JS-f:L-.day of October, 
1982. 
• I 
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